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ADVERSE POSSESSION AND PERPETUITIES
LAW: TWO DENTS IN THE
LIBERTARIAN MODEL OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON*
Richard Epstein adheres to what can fairly be called a "libertarian
model" of law. Although he occasionally implies that this model posi-
tively describes the law as it is, his is mainly a normative vision of what it
should be. With great energy and courage, over the past dozen years he
has used the model to assess, and often to condemn, prevailing legal doc-
trines in torts, contracts, labor law, and other fields. In his article "Past
and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property"' Epstein
carries the libertarian mission into new territory, and analyzes a number
of fundamental doctrines of property law that law-and-economics schol-
ars have largely ignored. Although in this comment I am often critical of
Epstein's analysis, I congratulate him for opening up these neglected top-
ics to debate.
I will first outline the libertarian model of law and contrast it with a
utilitarian model. I will then analyze the adverse possession and perpetu-
ities problems, and conclude that the venerable doctrines that govern
these areas reveal a utilitarian theme in property law. I will conclude by
contending that Epstein himself often lapses into utilitarianism, perhaps
because the reality of transaction costs makes a purely libertarian model
of property rights normatively untenable.
I. LIBERTARIAN AND UTILITARIAN MODELS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LAND
The credo of libertarianism - one with which I have considerable
sympathy - is that the law should allow individuals to pursue their own
ends, as they individually define them, with a minimum amount of state
interference. Although there are undoubtedly libertarian conceptions of
* Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law, Stanford Law School. I thank my
colleague Paul Goldstein for constructive suggestions, and Cheryl Davey for able research
assistance.
1. 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 667 (1986).
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property rights in labor, capital, and other resources, I will focus mainly
on rights in land.
In a libertarian utopia, the state would start by distributing most land,
perhaps even all land, to exclusive private owners.2 A libertarian state
would then confer on each landowner the maximum degree of freedom to
use the land that would be consistent with each neighbor also having that
same degree of freedom. Thus each landowner would have total freedom
of alienation, and would be constrained in using the land only by the law
of nuisance and other doctrines that constrain infliction of external
harms.' Whenever possible, the libertarian state would protect a land-
owner with what Calabresi and Melamed have called "property rules." 4
Property rules entitle a landowner to prevent the unconsented defeasance
of rights in land, even when compensation would be forthcoming. Thus,
property rules serve the libertarian goal of enabling a landowner to deter-
mine his own values and priorities. Property rules are often normatively
more appealing than "liability rules" because market prices, the usual
metric for legal compensation, fail to reflect any subjective surplus an
owner may have. Libertarians (and economists who abide by the Pareto
Superiority principle) are therefore suspicious of any "efficiency" justifi-
cations for legal rules that allow forced exchanges for compensation,
much less rules that legitimize uncompensated expropriations.
Utilitarianism, as I define it, differs from libertarianism in its willing-
ness to respond pragmatically to the reality of transaction costs. A prin-
cipled utilitarian is well aware of the dangers of using market values
either to measure compensation or to conduct cost-benefit analyses of
alternative policies. In situations where transaction costs are likely to be
small enough for consensual market exchanges to be the best resource
allocator available, a utilitarian is apt to join with a libertarian in advo-
cating the use of property rules to protect entitlements. Indeed, a utilita-
rian should regard property rules as the "default" rules of property law
- the ones that should apply in the absence of good reasons to the
contrary.
Unlike a libertarian, however, a utilitarian is willing to abandon prop-
erty rules in situations where market prices and other objective evidence
2. Although Epstein argues the virtues of a first-possession rule of initial distribution, any rule
that created exclusive rights would get the system going.
3. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 673-74, 694.
4. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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indicate that transaction costs are likely to prevent parties from entering
into mutually enhancing exchanges. In those situations, a utilitarian
would be willing to allow forced exchanges for compensation, and some-
times even uncompensated expropriations. The normative underpinning
of utilitarianism is the hunch that in the long run everyone will gain if
property rights are pragmatically defined to avoid messes in which high
transactions costs prevent the voluntary exchange process from reshuf-
fling resources to more highly valued uses.
II. A UTILITARIAN PERSPECTIVE ON ADVERSE POSSESSION
Epstein starts his system of "corrective justice" with "remorseless doc-
trines of original acquisition."5 Yet those doctrines turn out to be much
less than remorseless. He ends up concluding that when adverse posses-
sors have come to occupy the lands of original owners, transaction-cost
considerations - such as the costs of searching titles - may eventually
justify dents in the libertarian foundations of the property system. As
time passes, Epstein explains, "the lines cross." 6 Although he does not
reveal exactly what lines he has in mind, the phrase reveals that Epstein
is willing to apply a species of utilitarian cost-benefit analysis to deter-
mine when the interest of the original owner should be sacrificed for the
greater good of others.7
This is puzzling coming from someone usually reliably staunch in his
libertarianism. Libertarian principles make the expropriation of property
without compensation highly suspect. Moreover, adverse possession in
effect makes a landowner police against intruders. Libertarians usually
bridle at the legal creation of affirmative obligations to act.8
Yet adverse possession doctrine, as Epstein himself observes, makes
good utilitarian sense. In the next few pages I will attempt to elucidate
Epstein's insight that the "lines cross"-that at some point in time it
does make sense for the state to side with the adverse possessor and not
the original owner.
5. Epstein, supra note 1, at 676.
6. Id.
7. Epstein also resorts to a Rawlsian argument that a person choosing a rule from behind a
veil of ignorance would agree to a doctrine of adverse possession. See id. at 679-80. An unbending
libertarian would resist this analytic mode because it fails to respect differences between people as
they are.
8. Elsewhere, Epstein has indicated his opposition, under all circumstances, to the imposition
on bystanders of a legal duty to rescue. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151,
198-200 (1973).
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The rules applicable to adverse possession situations can affect the
costs that four parties-landowners, adverse possessors, land transferees,
and courts (financed by taxpayers)-are likely to incur. All the subdoc-
trines of adverse possession law can influence the magnitude of these
costs. I will analyze, however, just one substantive issue: the length of
the statute of limitations that sets a deadline within which the landowner
must begin an ejectment action or else risk losing out to the adverse pos-
sessor. This issue of the optimal length of the limitations period crops up
all over the legal landscape, yet to my knowledge it has not been sub-
jected to economic analysis. In analyzing statute length, I assume that
the other subdoctrines of adverse possession law-dealing with tacking,
continuity, color-of-title, and so on-are held constant.
A utilitarian legislature would set a time limit for the bringing of eject-
ment actions only if it perceived that adverse-possession disputes are po-
tentially fraught with high transaction costs. The outcomes of particular
adverse possession disputes have consequences for others besides the
original landowner (0) and the adverse possessor (A). As I will soon
explain more fully, these outcomes affect the welfare of as-yet-unidenti-
fied transferees of land. Moreover, the outcome of a particular adverse
possession dispute may significantly influence the individual morales of
0, A, and others; and hence their propensity to engage in antisocial or
prosocial behavior that affects third parties. Therefore, if the law were to
permit 0 to dawdle for an inefficiently long time period before bringing
an ejectment action, the law would impose deadweight losses on diffuse
third parties-losses that A would not have an incentive to bargain out of
existence.9
If a utilitarian legislature were to decide that it did want to set a dead-
line for ejectment actions, how would it go about setting the length of the
limitations period? Statutes of different lengths entail costs of different
magnitudes. Many of these costs are difficult or impossible to quantify.
A utilitarian legislator would turn to inexpensive sources of information,
9. Even if 0 and A were the only parties affected, transaction costs would not necessarily be
low. The bargaining situation is one of bilateral monopoly, and perhaps also one likely to be marked
by interpersonal enmity. I assume, however, that these sorts of barriers to mutually enhancing ex-
changes do not constitute an adequate utilitarian justification for stripping a property owner of prop-
erty-rule protection.
A utilitarian would not want distributive preferences, whether in favor of landowners or adverse
possessors, to affect the content of adverse possession law. Narrow legal doctrines are typically
inferior to broad tax and transfer programs as mechanisms of redistribution. See A. POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 105-13 (1983).
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such as market-price data, and perhaps readily available indirect meas-
ures of subjective value,"° to make the best feasible estimates of these
costs.
Figures One through Five contain hypothetical estimates of the vari-
ous types of costs that would be associated with ejectment-limitations
periods of between zero and twenty years. All costs shown have been
discounted to present value in the year of enactment of the limitations
statute. The figures divide into four categories the costs that a utilitarian
drafter of a statute of limitations of ejectment would want to consider.
Litigation costs, whether incurred by a court or a party, are pulled out
for separate treatment in Figure Four. Figures One through Three di-
vide up the remaining costs according to the party that bears them -
namely, original landowners, adverse possessors, and would-be transfer-
ees of land. I have no great stake in this particular taxonomy of costs.
My main purpose is simply to demonstrate the possibility of a utilitarian
analysis of alternative limitations periods."1
A. Landowners' Costs
Under any finite limitations period for ejectment, landowners run the
risk of permanently losing out to squatters. Landowners aware of this
risk must bear either uncertainty costs or additional monitoring costs.
The uncertainty costs are the disutilities they suffer from the prospect of
losing their lands. Monitoring costs are expenditures they choose to in-
cur to police against intruders in order to reduce these uncertainty costs.
In cases where O's actually lose their lands to A 's, O's and their sympa-
thizers bear what Michelman has called in another context "demoraliza-
tion costs." 2 Demoralization costs include not only their personal
10. See generally Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771
(1982).
11. The figures assume, for simplicity, that 0 and A place the same subjective value on the
disputed premises. If this assumption were relaxed, another figure, entitled "'misallocation costs,"
would be included. It would chart the costs of the risk that the law would bestow the land in dispute
on the "wrong" owner. When the law bestows an asset on a party who is not its highest-valuing
user, the transaction costs of a transfer to the highest-valuing user set a ceiling on the costs of that
particular misallocation.
The market value of the disputed land does not appear anywhere in the cost calculus. This is
proper if the act of adverse possession would not affect the quality of the possessed premises. If 0
were to lose Blackacre. with a market value of $ 1,000,000, to A, O's objective $1,000,000 loss would
be offset by A's objective $1,000,000 gain.
12 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. RFv. 1165, 1214 (1967).
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losses, but also the social losses that result when those who have been
demoralized become more antisocial in their behavior. The more wrong-
ful they perceive an expropriation to have been, the more severely land-
owners and their sympathizers will be demoralized. Note that a
landowner utterly unaware of the risk of adverse possession would, be-
cause of that innocence, bear no uncertainty or monitoring costs during
the period of A's adverse possession; this landowner might, however, on
account of that same innocence, suffer especially severe demoralization
costs were an A eventually to wrest legal ownership away from him.
Figure One
LANDOWNERS' COSTS
Costs (monitoring, uncertainty
and demoralization)
Incurred
Under
S/L
of that
Length
0 5 10 15 20
Statute of Limitations (in years)
Figure One suggests how the discounted present value of landowners'
costs of all types would vary with limitations periods varying from zero
to twenty years in length. The graph suggests the obvious: that land-
owners' costs rise as limitations periods become shorter. The shortening
of the period increases landowners' uncertainty, which landowners can
reduce only by increasing their expenditures on monitoring. Moreover,
as the period becomes shorter, returns to adverse possession would in-
crease and both more squatting and more numerous expropriations by
A's could be expected. The more frequently and sooner the O's lost their
property, the higher their demoralization costs would be.
B. Adverse Possessors' Costs
Figure Two illustrates how A's costs might vary with different limita-
tions periods. A's costs are of three varieties-uncertainty, preying, and
demoralization. As time passes, squatters put down roots and increas-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss3/4
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ingly rely on the right to control the adversely possessed territory. The
lengthening of the limitations period is thus likely to increase the uncer-
tainty costs of legally informed A's in two ways-by both increasing their
levels of anxiety before the limitation period lapses, and stretching out
the nailbiting period. A's preying costs are the counterpart of 0's moni-
toring costs. If aware of the contents of adverse possession law, a rent-
seeking squatter might make some outlays solely to enhance prospects of
a legally successful expropriation. The squatter might, for example,
spend time and money scouting the countryside for easy pickings, or in-
efficiently alter the use of adversely possessed lands solely to manufacture
more favorable legal evidence. 3 Lastly, just as legal expropriation may
demoralize O's, ejectments after lengthy periods in possession may de-
moralize A 's, especially A's with a good faith belief that the disputed
lands were theirs all along.
Figure Two
ADVERSE POSSESSORS' COSTS
(preying, uncertainty
Costs & demoralization)
Incurred
Under
S/L
of that
Length
0 5 10 15 20
Statute of Limitations (in years)
The curve in Figure Two has the shape of a lazy U. It assumes that
bad faith rent-seeking activity would be common if limitations periods
for ejectment were short, and thus, that the total preying costs would be
high under those conditions. The graph assumes that a five-year limita-
tions period, or thereabouts, would quell most quellable preying, and
that the curve would bottom out at that point. Further extensions of the
limitations periods are assumed to increase the uncertainty and demorali-
13. Similarly, in personal-injury cases an injured plaintiff has an incentive to malinger prior to
settlement in order to enhance awards for future medical expenses and impairment of earning capac-
ity Shortening the statute of limitations for tort claims helps reduce this cost.
Number 3]
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zation costs that the increasingly rooted A's would incur. Hence, after
five years, the curve representing adverse possessors' cost is rising.t 4
C. Transferees' Costs
Figure Three suggests how changes in the limitations period might af-
fect the administrative costs of land transfers. Adverse possession law is
a mixed blessing for transferees.15 As Epstein notes, it serves to clear
encumbrances revealed only in aged documents. This reduces purchas-
ers' title search costs (or related uncertainty costs, should purchasers
choose not to search). On the other hand, adverse possession law be-
stows valid claims upon persons not identified in the land records. A
transferee has three ways of dealing with the risk of valid unrecorded
claims. The transferee can simply bear the risk (thereby incurring uncer-
tainty costs), insure against it (thereby bearing the loading costs of the
applicable title-insurance coverage), or conduct a physical inspection
prior to closing to look for evidence of adverse possession (thereby incur-
ring inspection costs).16
14. The fact that all costs are discounted to present value is assumed not to be sufficient to
counterbalance these increases.
15. "Transferees" include vendees, mortgagees, lessees, and others affected by the quality of a
transferor's title. The text implies that transferees bear the consequences of all changes in transfer
costs. These changes may in fact be partly or wholly capitalized into land prices and thus borne by
transferors. So long as the taxonomy includes (and does not double-count) all relevant costs, I need
not resolve the incidence question.
16. I count as inspection costs any costs that transferees bear to assess, prior to closing, the
legal weightiness of any evidence of adverse possession that their inspections uncover.
Adverse possession is not the only legal doctrine that creates an incentive to inspect. In a state
with a notice or race-notice recording act, a transferee may desire to inspect prior to closing to guard
against the risk that the transferor has previously conveyed the land in question to another party.
The discussion in the text assumes that the risk of adverse possession is much more significant than
the risk of a double-dealing seller.
[Vol. 64:723
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Figure Three
TRANSFEREES' COSTS
(inspection, uncertainty
Costs & title search)
Incurred
Under
S/L
of that
Length
0 5 10 15 20
Statute of Limitations (in years)
Buying land would be chancy indeed if the statute of limitations for
ejectment were as short as one hour. Under those circumstances, a trans-
feree who chose the physical inspection option, for example, would have
to inspect within minutes of the closing. The curve in Figure Three
therefore associates high transferees' costs with short-fuse statutes. The
curve assumes that transferees' inspection costs fall sharply as the limita-
tions period lengthens, and reach bottom at a year or so, a time period
more than ample for the convenient scheduling of pre-closing inspec-
tions. Transferees' total costs are assumed to begin to rise as limitations
periods extend beyond one year, because longer deadlines increase title-
search costs by diminishing the encumbrance-clearing effects of adverse
possession.
D. Litigation Costs
Figure Four suggests how the costs of litigating adverse possession
cases vary with the length of the limitations period. I have given litiga-
tion costs - whether borne by landowners, adverse possessors, transfer-
ees, or taxpayers - separate treatment in order to assert that they have
little effect on the utilitarian value of different limitations periods. Fol-
lowing Posner, I define litigation costs as the sum of (1) outlays on litiga-
tion and (2) the costs of erroneous legal decisions.17 A utilitarian system
of civil procedure seeks, all else equal, to minimize the sum of these two
costs.
17. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 429-33 (2d ed. 1977).
Number 3]
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Figure Four
LITIGATION COSTS
Costs
Incurred
Under
S/L
of that
Length
0 5 10 15 20
Statute of Limitations (in years)
Litigation costs rise with both the number and average complexity of
litigated cases. In the adverse possession context, a lengthening of the
limitations period could be expected to reduce volume but to raise aver-
age complexity. A short statute would probably result in a high volume
of litigation, both because bad faith A's would prey more, and because
more good faith A's would go undetected for the statutory period. The
curve in Figure Four therefore indicates that the shortest statutes would
engender the highest litigation costs. On the other hand, the costs of
determining whether a particular A's possession had been open, hostile,
continuous, and so on, would tend to rise with the length of the limita-
tions period. A longer historical record would have to be examined and
ever more remote events would have to be reconstructed from memory.
The curve in Figure Four honors what I suspect is the conventional wis-
dom that the complexity effect eventually outweighs the reduced-
caseload effect as the period is lengthened; the Figure thus shows litiga-
tion costs rising slightly as the statutes become longer.1 8
Figure Four pictures litigation costs as only a minor part of the overall
utilitarian calculus. Epstein seems to share the perception that they are
rather unimportant. He notes that the "key value" of adverse possession
rules is to "shape . . .the primary conduct of the parties."19
18. Epstein implies that litigation costs rise with time. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 676. Be-
cause of discounting, postponing litigation saves costs, everything else being equal. Figure 4 is
drawn under the assumption that increases in other costs over time outweigh this saving.
19. Epstein, supra note 1, at 677.
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E. Total Costs
The hypothetical curves in Figures One through Four can be summed
vertically to produce a curve showing the total costs associated with stat-
utes of limitations of different length. Figure Five shows the shape of the
summed curve. The point at the bottom of this curve, Y*, indicates the
length, in years, of a cost-minimizing statute. In Figure Five, this length
happens to be about ten years. Because I drew the curves in Figures One
through Four from intuition, no one should take this particular outcome
seriously. I do observe, however, that the bottom of my total-cost curve
is rather flat, indicating that I intuitively regard limitations periods of
five to fifteen years as being in the right ballpark. Most states now have
adverse possession statutes that fall into this range.20 Figure Five also
suggests that a one-year statute and a fifty-year statute would both be far
outside the cost-minimizing range.
~Figure Five
TOTAL COSTS
Costs
Incurred
Under 
Ys
S/L
of that
Length
0 5 10 15 20
Statute of Limitations (in years)
Utilitarian analysis can illuminate other issues of adverse possession
law. For example, it helps explain Epstein's interest in a "two-tier" stat-
ute under which the claims of bad faith adverse possessors would take
longer to ripen. 21 Figure Two lumped together the costs of both good
20. See G. THOMPSON, 5 COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2552
n. 3, at 656-59 (1979). See also NAT'L L. J., Dec. 25, 1978, at 16 (indicating that 32 states have basic
limitations periods of between 5 and 15 years, with the periods in the remaining 18 states all falling
in the 18-to-30-year range. My knowledge of these facts may have subconsciously influenced how I
drew the curves.
21. Epstein, supra note 1, at 684-85.
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faith and bad faith adverse possessors. Changes in preying costs mostly
caused the left side of the lazy U in Figure Two to fall, and changes in
demoralization costs mostly caused the right side of the lazy U to rise.
Good faith and bad faith A's differ dramatically in the degree to which
they suffer these sorts of costs. Ejection demoralizes good faith A's more
than bad faith A 's, who rely less on their continuity of possession. Be-
cause good faith A's are innocents, only bad faith A's can incur preying
costs. If the costs of good faith adverse possessors and bad faith adverse
possessors were to be separately taffied, the curve for good faith A's
would therefore begin to turn upward before the curve for bad faith A's
would. If total costs were tallied separately for each group, the Y* for
good faith A's would thus be located to the left of the Y* for bad faith
A S.22
Statutes of limitations for ejectment have been becoming shorter.23
Utilitarian analysis supports these truncations. Barbed wire, the air-
plane, and other recent technological innovations have reduced landown-
ers' monitoring costs and transferees' inspection costs, thus shifting Y*
leftward.
III. A UTILITARIAN PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL TIME LIMITS ON
CONSENSUALLY CREATED PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS
Epstein believes that the libertarian first principles of property law
must be adjusted to accommodate the doctrine of adverse possession.
Yet when he turns his attention to equally venerable legal doctrines that
restrict a property owner's freedom to tie up a resource far into the fu-
ture, he is unwilling to bend first principles. He condemns, as inconsis-
tent with fundamental rights of alienation, the rule against perpetuities,
the doctrine that changed neighborhood conditions warrant the termina-
tion of covenants, and similar doctrines that nullify consensually created
land restrictions.
A utilitarian can effortlessly defend the basic thrust of these doctrines.
Figure Six depicts the general problem created by long-term restrictions
on property ownership and use. The Figure suggests that the benefits of
22. A utilitarian analysis of the two-tier proposal is complicated by the difficulty of proving A's
subjective intent. If legal outcomes were to turn in part on A's intent, both inspection and litigation
costs might rise.
23. Because of the influence of the Statute of 21 James I., ch. 16 (1623), the standard period was
once 20 years. Twenty-four states now have basic limitations periods of 10 years or less. NAT'L L.
J., Dec. 25, 1978, at 16.
[Vol. 64:723
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restrictions, measured year-by-year, decline as restrictions age. Costs, on
the other hand, rise. Eventually the costs of a restriction exceed its bene-
fits. The law still need not terminate the restriction at that point so long
as transaction-cost impediments would not unduly impede the affected
parties from consensually putting an end to the restrictions. Thus, courts
rightly refuse to apply the doctrine of changed conditions to old ease-
ments, because easements typically concern only two parties. Yet the
negotiated termination of other kinds of long-term restrictions can be
hard to arrange. If all beneficiaries must consent to termination, large
numbers, or the unreachability of a beneficiary, would throw a monkey
wrench into the bargaining process. In these situations, a doctrine that
terminates the restrictions as a matter of law at time T* spares the af-
fected parties, in the aggregate, from some costly combination of dead-
weight losses and transaction costs. (Legal termination doctrines of this
sort can apply ex ante when the restriction is created, or ex post as the
passage of time reveals the actual costs and benefits of the restriction. Ex
ante termination rules are allocatively cruder, but cheaper to administer.)
Figure Six
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PROPERTY
RESTRICTIONS, As TIME PASSES
$ values,
year-by-
year
Costs
T* Benefits
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Years Since Origination of Restriction
Although the general utilitarian analysis is the same, different termina-
tion doctrines are appropriate for ownership restrictions, as opposed to
use restrictions.
,4. Ownership restrictions
Entitling a current owner of property to designate the future owners of
the property serves two basic utilitarian functions. First, the greater the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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freedom to dispose, the greater the incentives to acquire wealth, and thus
to make socially productive use of labor, capital, and land. Second, and
more narrowly, freedom of testation inhibits, in people who have bequest
motives, the profligate squandering of assets during the autumn of life.
The utilitarian benefits of dead-hand control decline as the time period
controlled fades further into the future. People have positive discount
rates, that is, they care more about the near future than the far future.
Additionally, testators and trustors typically have deeper affections for
living, closely related descendants, than for unborn, distant ones. Prop-
erty doctrines that protect a testator's freedom to control ownership over
the course of the next several generations are therefore likely to garner
almost as many utilitarian benefits as a totally unfettered freedom of tes-
tation would. The benefits curve in Figure Six therefore associates few
benefits with ownership controls that operate far into the future.
The costs of ownership restrictions tend to rise slowly with time.
When class gifts are involved, owners multiply, and administrative costs
rise. When property has been tied up in a trust, the trust's administra-
tion is apt to become more burdensome as time passes. Individual trust-
ees die, and their replacements may insist upon accountings of the assets
before taking over; institutional trustees, if not supervised, are likely to be
stodgy managers of trust assets. Consensual escapes from the grip of old
restrictions are impossible because the dead are highly inflexible negotia-
tors. The rule against perpetuities responds on utilitarian fashion to
these realities. It expunges as a matter of law long-term, objectively
costly, ownership restrictions.
B. Use Restrictions
Rational actors would negotiate restrictions on land use only when
those restrictions would increase the total value of the benefited and bur-
dened lands as affected landowners would subjectively judge those val-
ues. Allowing landowners to tailormake controls that supplement the
law of nuisance and public land-use regulations advances libertarian
goals of private ordering. Because no one can predict the future, how-
ever, covenants that were originally well-tailored tend to become ill-fit-
ting. Affected landowners are eventually likely to perceive the subjective
costs of the restrictions as exceeding the subjective benefits. Yet, if many
parties are beneficiaries of the covenant scheme, transaction costs may
prevent them from unanimously agreeing to its elimination. Courts have
responded by developing the utilitarian doctrine of changed neighbor-
[Vol. 64:723
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hood conditions, a doctrine that cleanses subdivisions of objectively out-
moded covenants.
IV. Is EPSTEIN AN INCONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN?.
To a utilitarian, Epstein's normative criteria for assessing property
doctrines seem erratic. He is willing to bend the remorseless first princi-
ples of property rights to allow an adverse possessor to expropriate some-
one else's land. But for him, freedom of alienation is a principle never to
be dented because the process of consensual alienation involves "no ex-
ternalities." Yet to the utilitarian, the "lines cross" in both situations. In
both, the relaxation of the basic libertarian model of property promises to
clear up transaction-cost-perpetuated messes. To a utilitarian, whether
those messes arise because of physical externalities, the death of a testa-
tor, the presence of large number of beneficiaries, or whatever, is norma-
tively irrelevant.
Posner has advanced the controversial thesis that the common law, as
a positive matter, tends to evolve so as to maximize aggregate wealth.24
Some doctrines, for example, those that are part of the recent pro-com-
pensation thrust in tort law, are hard to square with Posner's thesis. Yet
the ancient and relatively stable doctrines of adverse possession and per-
petuities law generally support the Posnerian view.25 Anglo-American
law over the centuries has tended to apply "property rules" that respect a
property owner's subjective preferences only when this libertarian ap-
proach would not unloose a flood of either transaction costs or dead-
weight losses arising from failures in the exchange process. In situations
where evidence from market prices and other objective sources suggests
that a libertarian definition of property rights would unloose a flood of
costs, traditional property law rather predictably places dents in the lib-
ertarian model. As a positive matter, the deep structure of property law
has traditionally been not libertarianism, but transaction-cost utilitarian-
ism. This may appall Epstein, but it doesn't appall me.
24. For a concise statement of the theory, see Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the
Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9 HOSTRA L. REV. 775, 775-77 (1981).
25, Both courts and legislatures have shaped these doctrines; Posner's thesis was essentially one
about the behavior only of courts.
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